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Resumo: A integração vertical e a coordenação vertical são termos usados para descrever a indústria 
avícola . Uma estratégia de integração pode ser descrito como complexo com muitos parâmetros 
diferentes no jogo. Um dos principais argumentos para a integração vertical na indústria avícola é o 
argumento econômico - escala e margem de controle. Quando olhamos para a indústria o que 
encontramos lá são relativamente grandes variações de integração vertical total para organização 
baseado no mercado. As grandes variações tornam difícil ver como você pode promover argumentos 
econômicos consistentes como justificativa para decisões. A Teoria Econômica Institucional 
reconhece, contudo, que as decisões possam ser influenciada pelo ambiente institucional. As 
instituições são essencialmente regras de conduta, e como tal, deve de alguma forma ser possível 
prever as decisões, se você tiver um bom conhecimento das principais instituições. As características 
culturais nacionais ou regionais representam a este respeito uma interessante instituição. Neste artigo 
vamos discutir a cultura como uma possível explicação para as variações no grau de integração vertical 
na indústria avícola. 
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Abstract: Vertical integration and vertical coordination are terms used to describe the poultry 
industry. An integration strategy is described as complex with many different parameters in play. A 
major argument for vertical integration in the poultry industry is the economic argument - scale and 
margin control. When we look into the industry we find there are relatively large variations from total 
vertical integration to market based organization. The large variations make it difficult to see how you 
can promote consistent economic arguments as justification for decisions. Institutional economic 
theory acknowledges, however, that decisions can be influenced by the institutional environment. 
Institutions are essentially rules of conduct, and as such it should to some extent be possible to predict 
the decisions, if you have good knowledge of the main institutions. National or regional cultural 
characteristics represent in this respect an interesting institution. In this article we will discuss culture 
as a possible explanation for the variations in degree of vertical integration in the poultry industry. 
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Introduction 
 
"The poultry industry is characterized in most countries by a high level of 
vertical coordination ..." (HENRY and ROTHWELL, 1995:1). From North American 
broiler industry, we see that "Integrators usually own hatcheries, feed mills, slaughter 
plants, and further processing plants-that is, they may be vertically integrated into all 
stages except for broiler production, where they rely on networks of growers 
assembled through production contracts "(Macdonald, 2008:3). In Norway the 
situation is different, with limited coordination between the various stages in the 
value chain (Andersen, Skinnarland and Tveterås, 2008). Kuwait operates with major 
integrated companies (Al-NASSER, 2006). Denmark has a structure similar to the 
Norwegian, while in Brazil there appears to be a large variation in the degree of 
vertical integration. According to Silva, Nogueira and Saes (2005) the Brazilian 
poultry industry varies between vertical integration at one extreme through 
partnership contracts and informal agreements, to the use of the spot market at the 
other extreme. In Parana, which represents the most modern part of the industry in 
Brazil where significant portions of the production are exported, the partnership 
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agreements dominate. Silva et al (2005) set up an explanation for the differences in 
organizational form based on the transaction cost theoretical analysis, but end up 
explaining the difference as a question of strategic choice. When one is unable to 
explain the companies' different choice from a cost perspective, which is the core of 
transaction cost theory; it is interesting and requires further investigation. 
I have a basic transaction cost approach when I analyze governance structures 
in the poultry industry. It is interesting though when through literature studies and 
empirical observations you can see there is considerable variation in the choices 
made, and when those differences appear to be of national or regional character. It 
may be appropriate to extend the analytical approach by exploring one of the 
openings in institutional economic theory: that decision regarding institutional 
arrangements is made within the context of specific institutional environment 
(WILLIAMSON 1990, WILLIAMSON 2000). The institutional arrangement defined 
by Davis and North (1971) as “arrangement between economic units that governs the 
way in which these units can cooperate and/or compete. … The arrangement may 
either be a formal or an informal one, and it may be temporary or long-lived. It 
must … provide a structure within which its members can cooperate to obtain some 
added income that is not available outside the structure” (p.7). Institutional 
environment is defined then as ”the set of fundamental political, social and legal 
ground rules that establishes the basis for production, exchange and distribution” 
(p.6). All elements, political, legal and cultural are of course of interest, as it is often 
the case that businesses are driven to adapt to the society they are a part of to gain 
legitimacy. In this article we are particularly interested in the cultural aspect. The 
culture in many ways represents a strong force keeping society together, and as a 
major force in forming individuals that are part of society. When important decisions 
are to be made, where there is room for discretion, it is not unnatural to think that 
the judgment is influenced by the cultural context you are in. A study by Diez-Vial 
and Alvarez-Suescon (2011) regarding vertical integration in Spanish food production 
indicates that the geographic proximity between different enterprises in the supply 
chain can help reduce pressure on vertical integration, this as a result of belonging to 
the same local community and by sharing social and political value. When business 
adapts to established institutions it is assumed that it contributes to its legitimacy 
and survival (cf. e.g. MEYER and ROWAN, 1977, and CAMPBELL, 2004).  
Institutions thus contribute with information about action opportunities and rewards 
to participants (Nielsen 2005). From institutional theory, we see that ”the formal 
structures of many organizations in postindustrial society dramatically reflect the 
myths of their institutional environments instead of the demands of their work 
activities” (MEYER and ROWAN, 1977:341). 
The purpose of the article is to discuss the importance of institutional 
environments in relation to decisions about degree of vertical integration within the 
poultry industry. In the next chapter we present an insight into the rationality of the 
transaction cost theory. In chapter three we will provide a short general picture of the 
poultry industry. In the fourth chapter we present the main arguments behind 
decisions of vertical integration from the cases included in our study. The fifth 
chapter discusses the implications of the empirical findings. In the last chapter we 
summarize the argument. 
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2. Rationality in the Transaction Cost Theory 
 
To get started, it is interesting to see what we understand by vertical 
integration, and what represents a reasonable justification for decisions behind 
vertical integration. 
What we are to understand by vertical integration is to some extent discussed 
in the literature (see e.g. WILLIAMSON, 1971, 1975, GROSSMANN and HART, 1986, 
BALAKRISHNAN and WERNERFELT, 1986, PERRY, 1989, JOSKOW, 1985 and 
2005). The predominant view is that vertical integration represents one extreme of 
an organizational continuum, ranging from vertical integration to the spot market; 
"inherent in the notion of vertical integration is the elimination of contractual or 
market exchanges" (PERRY, 1989:185). Furthermore, most agree that vertical 
integration means that the entity has ownership to the means of production, and thus 
has the power to make decisions about investment, employment, production and 
distribution. Grossman and Hart (1986) do not distinguish between ownership and 
control in one of their definitions of the enterprise, thus pushing the limits of the idea 
of vertical integration. 
In reality it might be that what is described as a vertically integrated chain of 
production, combines solutions that involve ownership and contractual control – see 
Perry (1989) who writes that: ”a firm can be described as vertically integrated if it 
encompasses two single-out-put production processes…” (p. 185). 
Discussions on the foundation of vertical integration go back to Coase (1937) 
where the costs associated with the use of the market were on the agenda. In an 
assessment of whether to use the market or the hierarchy Williamson (1971) states 
that vertical integration will provide access to special incentives, control instruments 
and structural advantages. In the hierarchy you will have access to incentives that 
make it easier to deal with potential opportunism. Regarding the aspect of control, 
vertical integration provides you with constitutional authority, easy access to decision 
data and easier access to dispute resolution mechanisms. To be in the same structure 
can be helpful in facilitating communication, assuming that the actors have the same 
type of training and experience. 
On the question of choosing one or the other of the different governance 
structures Williamson (1979) suggests we have a closer look into three dimensions: 
Level of transaction-specific investments, transaction frequency and uncertainty. 
Transaction-specific investments are understood as "durable investments that are 
undertaken in support of particular transactions" (WILLIAMSON, 1987:55). 
Although not explicitly stated, it must be reasonable to assume that the term 
investment also includes costs related to the maintenance of the investment. 
Transaction frequency is of course related to the number of transactions within a 
given time. Uncertainty is linked to various factors such as technological 
development, consumer behavior, and incidents. Furthermore, it is linked to 
behavioral uncertainty (WILLIAMSON, 1975). Peter Tamin (1979) is a central source 
for Williamson’s discussion of behavioral uncertainty. Tamin says that within 
different contexts we should anticipate different behavior like instrumental, 
hierarchical or traditional behavior. In transaction cost theory the main behavioral 
focus is on opportunistic behavior where actors are excessively busy pursuing their 
own interests. How much you should fear opportunistic behavior is debated and Das 
(2004) says that the market in the long run will eliminate actors who are known to 
act opportunistically. The strong focus on opportunism in the transaction cost theory 
is well in line with what is described as the fundamental principle in economic theory, 
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namely that actors are primarily concerned with their own interests (SEN, 1977). In 
the theory the combination of high transaction frequency, transaction specific 
investments and uncertainty should lead to vertical integration. When transaction 
frequency is low, no transaction-specific investments are made and uncertainty is 
low, the market solution is to be preferred. 
The core argument in the transaction cost theory when you are assessing the 
governance structure is related to estimating costs of a few key parameters. Some of 
the costs such as investment costs, transportation and the like, are relatively easy to 
calculate. When you are to calculate costs based on assumptions on human behavior 
it becomes more complex. In this type of cost estimates, which are central in 
transaction cost theory, you would have to make assessments on how you think about 
how different processes such as negotiation, conflict resolution and communication 
take place. The key is to determine what type of behavior you think is most likely to 
occur. New institutional economic theory is in many ways saying we should expect 
actors to be psychological egoists, in which case the costs and risks will be higher 
than if the actors behave altruistically. Besides affecting the level of costs, the 
behavioral assumption can have direct (independent) influence on the decision 
regarding what kind of governance structure you should choose. The argument is 
illustrated in a simple model – cf. Figure 01. 
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Figure 01 -  Vertical integration – classic desicion 
 
The fascinating thing with transaction cost theory is that you consciously 
choose to ignore the parameter that can help to describe the community where the 
business is established – the embeddedness parameter (WILLIAMSON, 1998). 
Through that parameter you can gain further understanding of the traditions, norms, 
religion, informal institutions that apply. This is clearly a much more difficult 
approach than relying on a simple behavioral assumption, but on the other hand, it 
can contribute to a more realistic understanding of the challenges. 
 
3. The Poultry Industry 
 
In the introduction we have seen that there is a relatively large variation in 
relation to the degree of vertical integration in the poultry industry. The value chain 
in the industry includes several independent stages of production (see Figure 02). 
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Figure 02 - Vertical integration in the poultry industry 
Source: Henry and Rothwell, 1995:2 
 
The norm, if we look at the literature, seems to be that “Integrators usually 
own hatcheries, feed mills, slaughter plants, and further processing plants—that is, 
they may be vertically integrated into all stages except for broiler production, 
where they rely on networks of growers assembled through production contracts” 
(MAcDONALD, 2008:3). With relatively large geographical proximity between 
growers and slaughter plants where there are many growers and relatively few 
slaughter plants, there is a relatively large interdependency between actors in the 
industry. This way of organizing the production helps to lower the costs, for instance 
transport costs, and thus contribute to the profitability of the industry. Large units in 
a geographically small area can thus be preferable. 
In the literature we can see that the constructions of specialized production 
facilities represent a significant investment for growers. The broiler houses are 
expanding, and technological solutions are becoming ever more sophisticated. One 
challenge is that broiler houses have limited alternative applications (MAcDONALD, 
2008). Investment levels will probably vary depending on which climate zone 
production takes place. Breeding of chickens requires the ‘right’ balance between 
elements like feed, light, temperature, humidity, etc. What we can see is that livestock 
production in the Nordic countries and North America, with the cold winters 
represent one type of challenge, extreme heats that we can find in Kuwait represent 
another type of challenge, whereas Brazil seem to have a more ideal climate for 
poultry production. 
We notice that the production time for broilers is short, 38-52 days, which 
indicates relatively high transaction rates (MANNING, BAINES and CHADD, 2008). 
For an illustration of the development in the broiler industry, see Table 01. 
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Table 01 - Development in the broiler industry 
Year Age to market (wks) 
Feed per pound of 
gain (lbs) 
Market weight (lbs) 
1925 15,0 4,0 2,8 
1950 12,0 3,3 3,1 
1975 7,5 2,1 3,8 
1990 6,5 1,9 4,5 
Source: Martinez, 2002. 
 
We also notice that different groups of customers have specific demands 
regarding quality and weight of chicken and chicken products. Product pricing is a 
key competitive element in the industry (cf. HENRY and ROTHWELL, 1995). 
Altogether we have many arguments pointing in the direction of substantial control 
over the supply chain. Martinez (2002) makes a point of the benefits gained from 
increased vertical control in the broiler industry, for instance lowered production 
costs, compared with the costs of independent producers, technological development, 
better disease control, better breeds, together with the lowering of costs.    
If we look at the relationship between integrator and breeders, this seems to be 
relatively long-lasting and stable. MacDonald (2008) let us know that the average 
length of the relationship between the integrator and breeder is 13 years. The contract 
period may, however, vary widely, from contracts relating to individual flocks to long-
term contracts up to 15 years. Breeders with the most up to date technology tend to 
have the longest contracts while breeders with older production facilities have 
contracts of shorter duration. Thus, production technology and not behavior seems to 
be the core argument for maintaining or discontinuing a relationship. From the 
literature on contracting between integrator and breeder (see e.g. TSOULOUHAS, 
1999, TSOULOUHAS and VUKINA, 1999, VUKINA 2001, LEVY and VUKINA, 2002, 
WU, 2003, LEVY and VUKINA, 2004, LEEGOMONCHAI and VUKINA, 2005, 
VUKINA, T. and LEEGOMONCHAI, 2006, WU, 2006, ZHENG and VUKINA, 2007, 
VUKINA and ZHENG, 2007, DUBOIS and VUKINA, 2009, VUKINA and ZHENG, 
2011) it appears fairly clear that one builds on the fundamental concept in economic 
theory that participants are primarily concerned with self-interest, and therefore it is 
necessary to set up a contract with stimulating incentives. The most common contract 
today, according Vukina (2001) is a two-part cardinal-tournament scheme. 
”Tournaments are labor contracts in which an individual’s payoff depends on his or 
her own performance relative to that of others” (VUKINA and ZHENG, 2011:1). 
Production costs and technology as we have seen are important factors in the 
poultry industry, Henry and Rothwell (1995) argue that the issues surrounding the 
market position and margin control, biosecurity and quality, as well as economies of 
scale and optimization of capital resources have been forces that have affected the 
increased degree of vertical integration. The general impression in the food industry 
is that there is a focus on avoiding unnecessary disruptions in the production process, 
and that this is something that has helped to push forward the increased degree of 
vertical integration (GILSON, SABEL and SCOTT, 2009 and MARTINEZ, 2002) 
 
4. Vertical Integration in Brazil, Kuwait and Norway/Denmark 
 
Organizations that are part of this study are found in different cultural 
clusters, as they are defined by the GLOBE-study (HOUSE et al. 2004). In the 
GLOBE-study social culture is defined as “shared motives, values, beliefs, identities, 
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and interpretation of meanings of significant events that result from common 
experiences of members of collectives and are transmitted across age generations” 
(HOUSE et al. 2002:5). 
Brazil is part of the Latin-American culture; a culture characterized by high 
power distance and low performance orientation, uncertainty avoidance, future 
orientation, and institutional collectivism. People are less concerned with 
institutional collectivism, but all the more keen to protect their own status in the 
community and in-group. Leadership-wise, there is a relatively strong value 
based/charismatic and team-oriented approach, while we also will find elements of a 
self-protective approach. Kuwait is part of the Arab culture; a culture characterized 
by a high focus on in-group collectivism and high power distance. It has a low score 
on future orientation and gender equality. Leadership-wise, a team-oriented and 
charismatic approach seems to be most effective, while it is noted that "it can be 
argued that an outstanding leadership style is not associated with an image of 
extremity" (KABASAKAL and BODUR, 2002:49). Organizational-wise it is important 
to build trust and good relationships, as most businesses in this culture are family 
owned. Norway and Denmark are part of the Nordic culture. The image drawn of the 
Nordic culture is that it has a moderate to strong practice in relation to uncertainty 
avoidance, future orientation, institutional collectivism and gender equality. Practice 
is weaker compared to the in-group collectivism, performance orientation, 
assertiveness and power distance. Leadership-wise the Nordic culture is 
characterized by a relatively strong value based/charismatic, team-oriented and 
participatory approach. 
Based on literature studies and interviews with actors in the broiler industry, 
we find there are different approaches to the question on vertical integration.   
 
Table 02 - Vertical integration 
 Brazil Kuwait Norway/Denmark 
Production 
organization 
More recent: 
Integration and 
partnership 
contracting. 
(Older: Market based 
organization.) 
Vertical integration 
Cooperative contracts 
and market based 
coordination 
Main reason behind 
choice of vertical 
integration 
Improving position as 
competitor on the 
international market. 
An important goal is to 
control animal health, 
security of supply, and 
the ability to conduct 
long-term investment 
(control). 
Tradition with keeping 
control with all levels 
of production, and thus 
a lack of a well-
functioning market. 
 
Tradition with 
cooperative solutions 
in food production, 
where various parties 
specialize in certain 
areas of production 
 
In an article by Taube-Netto (1996) we are presented with the systematic 
approach used by of one of the major Brazilian poultry producers, Saida. They have 
had an operation analytic approach to the production in order to try and capture all 
relevant decision areas. To meet the demands of the consumers the production is 
carefully planned. Everything from choosing types of chicken, composition of feed, 
feeding, and transport distances between farms and slaughterhouses, slaughter and 
processing procedures, etc. The degree of specialization seems to be so strong that it 
normally would be an argument for vertical integration or strong vertical control. The 
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LAR Company stated that it is important to have control over the value chain, partly 
because they operate in the export market. For this reason also part of the breeders 
are ISO certified. Although Brazil has many naturally given conditions in order to 
become successful in chicken productions (NUNES, 2004), the competitive situation 
in the industry calls for a strong focus on a number of details in all stages of 
production. Previously we have seen that there are differences regarding degree of 
vertical integration in the Brazilian broiler industry. Silva et al. (2005) explained this 
with the time periods different districts entered the industry. In the State of Sao 
Paulo there is a mix between market organization in the older part of the industry 
and integration and partnerships in the more recent part of the industry. In the State 
of Parana the dominant structure is a mix between integration and partnerships. 
Partnership is defined in a way where the integrator supplies inputs (feed, vaccines, 
and medications, cut chicks) and technical assistance to the producer. The producer 
is responsible for breeding facilities, equipment and handling. Description of the 
Kuwaiti chicken production by Al-Nasser (2006) indicates a development from a 
situation of small-scale production to large integrated corporations. As one of the 
larger companies, Kuwait United Poultry Company (KUPCO) includes an egg laying 
division, breeding units, broiler farms, slaughterhouses, processing plants, feed mills 
and veterinary sections. They are also involved in trading and distribution of poultry 
and poultry processed products, and import of poultry, eggs and other related food 
materials. The company also operates and manages restaurants, cafes and food 
processing centers. The Norwegian production system is characterized by 
cooperatives. In the poultry industry, as in other industries within food production, 
one company (NORTURA) acts as market regulator. It is a role they have been given 
by the State. At the same time the company acts as an integrator and controls about 
73 % of the broiler market (KJØTT- Og Eggmarkedet 2011). The most striking thing 
about the Norwegian market is the “apparently limited coordination between 
processing and primary producers" (Andersen, Skinnarland and Tveterås, 
2008:115). This is something we see clearly when talking to Ytterøy chicken about 
poultry production. Farmers buy feed from which supplier they want. They are also 
responsible for purchasing hatching chickens from an independent supplier and 
where they will deliver the chickens when they are ready for slaughter, based on the 
contracts that have been made. Andersen et al. (2008) point out that this is a result of 
deliberate policy by the Norwegian government. The market regulation and 
agricultural policy counteracts the increased degree of coordination. Danish chicken 
industry has a strong industry organization, where the industry itself is defining 
quality standards, guiding manufacturers in relation to production economics, 
keeping production statistics etc. The cooperatives also represent the industry in the 
political debate, so that individual producers do not have to engage in political 
lobbying. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Why do we find different approaches to the question of vertical integration in 
the poultry industry in different regions?  
From a theoretical standpoint, there are basically two key assessments to be 
made, a cost assessment and a behavioral assessment where the main goal is to 
generate a cost-effective production. 
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5.1 Cost Assessment 
 
We have seen that the poultry industry is an industry where you need to have a 
watchful eye to consumer preferences at any time. At the same time there is a strong 
focus on disease control. In the smallest business (slaughter plant) in this study there 
is a daily production of about 10 to 15,000 chickens, through approximately 50,000 
on the medium sized plant and up over 300,000 chickens per day on the larger 
plants, which means a continuous pressure on output at all stages of the process. 
When we also can see that the production involves substantial transaction-specific 
investments and high transaction rates, there is much in favor of vertical integration 
in the industry. Arguments against vertical integration can be derived from the 
market situation. Strong fluctuations in the demand for chicken can contribute to 
overcapacity or under-capacity in the industry, where over-capacity in the short term 
will have the greatest negative impact on the economy of the actors. Fierce 
competition will challenge the industry's ability to develop, including technological 
development. With a large amount of capital tied up in old technology, companies 
run the risk of loss in the competition, if others choose solutions where part of the 
risk is transferred to others. This is not unique reasoning but reasoning that can be 
performed by all actors in the poultry industry. However, we see that different 
solutions regarding governance structures are chosen.  
 
5.2 Behavioral Assessments 
 
Basics in economic theory suggest that actors are primarily concerned with 
their own interests and that some actors will be more aggressive in pursuing their 
own interests than others. Regarding vertical integration, there is a central idea that 
vertically integrated systems ensure better behavioral control than other governance 
structures. According to Williamson (1971) hierarchical organizations have access to 
incentives, control instruments and structural advantages that other organizational 
forms do not have. What is status in the poultry industry? Production-wise, there is a 
large volume of birds that has to be processed through the chain of production every 
day. If the integrator loses one or more breeders, and they cannot be replaced 
immediately, it may have a significant impact on the integrator’s economy. The 
breeder will also suffer financially if he cannot utilize the means of production he is in 
control of. In this way we can present a simple reasoning, relating to how the unrest 
in one part of the production chain can inflict other negative consequences. All actors 
in the chain of production are best served by stability. A strong degree of ‘negative’ 
opportunism could affect stability. 
What we experience from the poultry industry is that different actors seem to 
be concerned with the long-lasting relationships even though the duration of specific 
contracts can vary widely. In the long run, actors are not, as Das (2004) points out, 
served by behaving opportunistically. One factor we should keep in mind is that the 
various actors in the industry are concentrated in the relatively limited geographical 
areas, which may help to facilitate dissemination of any information related to 
opportunism. 
Looking solely on transaction cost theory, there should be no reason for 
considering the need for vertical integration differently in the poultry industry. 
Viewed in isolation, we should be able to see the same type of governance structure 
across borders, at least within the same nation - cf. Brazil as that is the nature of 
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institutional theory. A time related argument like Silva et al (2005) are using, that 
different regions established the broiler industry at different times and therefore have 
chosen different governance structure, seems a bit strange. It is not a rational 
argument, seen from a transaction cost perspective. The theory's institutional 
character reflects that it is a rationalized decision chain. If we do find that practice 
deviates from the rationality of the theory, we cannot look for reasonable answers 
within theory, but we have to search outside the theory. 
 
5.3 The interesting question 
 
If it is true that we can present fairly universal arguments related to cost 
assessments and behavioral assessments in the poultry industry, we are still left with 
the question of why different companies chose differently regarding vertical 
integration. Why is it that KUPCO in Kuwait owns the entire production chain while 
potential integrators in Norway and Denmark do not have ownership of the 
production chain, instead having a strong cooperativism?  In Brazil why do we find a 
market solution and a combination of vertical integration and partnership? What 
affects the actors’ judgment in the decision making processes? What is it that makes 
some people prefer hierarchical solutions while others prefer market solutions? 
Through the introduction and theory section, we noted that there may be  
interesting to consider the institutional environment's impact on the  actors’ behavior 
in relation to the choice of institutional arrangement. Davis and North (1971) has 
pointed to the cultural, political and legal framework. We have seen that the solutions 
in Norway/Denmark and Kuwait are within what is described as the tradition. The 
cultural reasoning can however be different. Keeping within the societal culture in the 
Nordic countries you do not need to expose yourself to risk. You have reasonable 
control of where you want to be in one-to-ten years, not to mention you contribute to 
preserve existing practice. You might lose something due to the lack of competitive 
drive, but you can save something by not challenging established practices, and this 
might be the reasonable way to deal with the issue of vertical integration. The Kuwaiti 
solution also lies within an established tradition in which the in-group ('family') is the 
key. The normal solution, based on societal culture, is the vertically integrated 
system, while spot market solutions will be the exception. The Brazilian approaches 
as we have seen, vary and that is very interesting. As with Kuwait, the Brazilian 
societal culture has a strong focus on the in-group, and that single individuals are 
concerned with their own position in the group. Changes you will need to make when 
moving from a market organization, (as it appears to be the predominant situation in 
the state of Sao Paulo) to increased vertical integration, will mean you would have to 
challenge your own and others' positions in the network that have developed over 
time.  Such a change can be very challenging, and thus you might not undergo such 
change without a crisis in the industry. In the state of Parana we can see the ‘modern’ 
way of organizing the poultry industry, with a mix of vertical integration and 
contractual control. What can be noticed is that instead of using the term contract, 
the softer term partnership is used. In classical contractual relationships it is normal 
to think that the contractual partner shall be held at arm's length, while the 
partnership allows for a more inclusive and close relationship – an in-group way of 
thinking of the relation. My main argument here is that that there seems to be a 
cultural commitment to preserve established relationships while it may culturally be 
more difficult to make changes in relationships where there has evolved a form of 
status clarification between different actors in the ‘family’. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
The challenge I have looked into and the main issue raised in the article is why 
we find different forms of governance structures within the poultry industry, an 
industry that is often described as a strong vertically integrated/coordinated industry. 
The data show considerable variation in organizational form. When we use 
transaction cost theory as a basis for our analysis on integration strategy, the findings 
show us that it is necessary to have a keen eye to the theory's behavioral assumption. 
There is no guarantee that you can apply the classical economic assumption that 
agents are utility-maximizing or that they will act in a very opportunistic way. It can 
be, and that's my concern, that it is the fundamental cultural traits that govern 
behavior. In some cultures e.g. the Anglican culture, which is described as a strong 
performance culture, it may be that there is a stronger correlation between the basic 
economic behavioral assumption and the way one treats the issue of vertical 
integration. Considering empirical findings and analysis, it may be prudent to slightly 
adjust the model that was presented earlier in the article, so that it more closely 
accounts for the institutional environment's importance in different organizational 
forms. 
 
    
Figure 03 - Vertical integration – including institutional environment 
 
The idea is that elements of the institutional environment effect how you 
evaluate the costs that form an important basis for decisions about the choice of 
organizational form, and the direct impact on the final decision, in part, regardless of 
how the costs emerge. 
It is too early to draw definite conclusions, with the empirical basis that is 
brought forward in this study, so it will be necessary to conduct further research. 
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